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AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980; AGO ltr, 29 Apr 1980	

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# **GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE**

**IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
DOD 5200.1-R & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652**

## **THIS DOCUMENT IS:**

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**BY**

**Defense Documentation Center  
Defense Supply Agency  
Cameron Station  
Alexandria, Virginia 22314**

# **SECURITY**

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (24 Apr 72)

DAFD-OTT-712874

5 May 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Report (6) Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 97th Military Police Bn, ~~Headquarters, 97th Military Police Bn~~

*(U) (8)*

SEE DISTRIBUTION

*(7) Operational rpt. for 31 Oct 71.*

*period ending*

*(12) 30 p.*

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAED-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General



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AVBGF-JB

28 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police  
Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

The following changes will be made in the above report as directed.

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.c. Personnel, Morale and Discipline:

## (1) Decorations:

(e) Bronze Star 57 (change)

(h) ARCOM 100 (change)

## (5) R&amp;R

MonthUtilized

July 100% (change)

September 97% (change)

October 100% (change)

## (6) Strengths:

## (a) US

## 2 As of 31 October 1971:

AUTHASG

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
25	2	719	746	23	2	731 (change)	756 (change)

## (8) Discipline, Law and Order:

(c) Article 15, UCMJ - 100 (change)

Add (d) General Courts - 0

2(C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations:c. Operations:

## (1) Combined Police Operations:

Add(d) COMMAND ACTION: Actions recommended in Subparagraph c, have been initiated throughout MR 2 (S).

## (2) Physical Security:

Add(d) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

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Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(3) Intensified Operations at Myca Checkpoint:

Add(d) COMMAND ACTION: Search operations are limited to short periods of 1 to 1½ hours depending on the volume of traffic through the checkpoint.

(4) Raids on Unit Areas:

Change (1), (2) and (3) to (a), (b) and (c).

Add (d) COMMAND ACTION: Information pertaining to proposed raids is disseminated to minimum essential personnel only.

(5) Utilization of Nung Guards:

Change (1), (2) and (3) to (a), (b) and (c).

Add(d) COMMAND ACTION: Recommendation has been made to supported installation to increase Nung Guard strength and provide them with necessary support.

(6) Patrol Dogs:

Change (1), (2) and (3) to (a), (b) and (c).

Add(d) COMMAND ACTION: Patrol dog teams have been trained in sufficient numbers to provide 24 hour patrol coverage.

d. Organization:

Add(4) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

e. Training:

Add(4) COMMAND ACTION: Recommended changes have been incorporated into the POI for replacement personnel.

f. Logistics:

Add(4) COMMAND ACTION: Requests have been forwarded through appropriate channels to fill existing shortages.

g. Communications:

Add(4) COMMAND ACTION: Requests have been forwarded through appropriate channels to fill existing shortages.

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
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Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

h. Materiel:

Add(4) COMMAND ACTION: N/A

  
JAMES E. REICHEL  
LTC, MPC  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2-Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-FD, APO 96558
- 3-Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVJDO-DO, APO 96375
- 5-Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, ATTN: AVBGF-B, APO 96349

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 97TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION  
APO San Francisco 96312

AVBGF-JB

1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police  
Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

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1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

*The mission of this battalion is to*  
a. Mission: Provide military police and provost marshal type services to sub-area coordinators, tactical units, commanders without organic military police, and others as directed by the Commanding Officer, 16th Military Police Group, utilizing personnel and equipment resources assigned or attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion.

b. Organization: (See Inclosure 1)

c. Personnel, Morale and Discipline:

(1) Decorations:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TOTAL AWARDED</u>
(a) Silver Star	0
(b) Legion of Merit	2
(c) Soldier's Medal	0
(d) Bronze Star with "V"	4
(e) Bronze Star	55
(f) Air Medal	4
(g) ARCOM with "V"	5
(h) ARCOM	97
(i) Purple Heart	1
(j) Good Conduct	90
(k) Brigade Certificate of Achievement	37

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(2) Key Personnel Assignments and Departures:

(a) Assignments:

Name	Grade	Job Title	Date
Larry D. Schroeder	CPT	CO, 218th MP Co	May 71
Christino Duran	SFC	Plt Sgt, HHD 97th MP Bn	May 71
Jeffrey D. Goodwin	CPT	CO, 630th MP Co	Jun 71
William W. Ballew	1LT	S2, 97th MP Bn	Jun 71
Jim Gates	SFC	S4 Sgt, 97th MP Bn	Jun 71
Cap. Jino Jimenez-Mendez	SFC	Plt Sgt, 127th MP Co	Jun 71
James E. Reichel	LTC	CO, 97th MP Bn	Jul 71
Stephen McMillin	MAJ	XO, 97th MP Bn	Jul 71
Harry T. Blackford	1LT	Phys Sec Off, 178th MP Det	Jul 71
Stephen E. Hanna	1LT	Plt Ldr, 218th MP Co	Jul 71
Charles D. Wade	CW2	Auto Maint Tech, 97th MP Bn	Jul 71
Clarence James	CSM	CSM, 97th MP Bn	Jul 71
Robert Owens	LTC	Provost Marshal, 178th MP Det	Aug 71
Donald R. Cagle	CPT	S3 Off, 97th MP Bn	Aug 71
Vincent D. Ferreira :	CPT	CO, 630th MP Co	Aug 71
Michael L. Wall	CPT	OIC, Drug Treatment Center	Aug 71
John S. Anderson	1LT	Plt Ldr, 630th MP Co	Aug 71
Robert Herman	1LT	Plt Ldr, 630th MP Co	Aug 71
Steven J. Knox	1LT	127th MP Co	Aug 71
John K. Ruffner	1LT	Plt Ldr, 127th MP Co	Aug 71
Arthur C. Stites	1LT	Plt Ldr, 630th MP Co	Aug 71
James R. Webb	1LT	Plt Ldr, 981st MP Co	Aug 71
James L. Lewis	SFC	Plt Sgt, 630th MP Co	Aug 71
Stephen C. Hokanson	CPT	S4 Off, 97th MP Bn	Sep 71
James M. Frost	1LT	Plt Ldr, 981st MP Co	Sep 71
Charles M. Rode	1LT	Plt Ldr, 218th MP Co	Sep 71
Calvin M. Wax	1SG	1SG, 630th MP Co	Sep 71
Leon C. Smith	SFC	Plt Sgt, 630th MP Co	Sep 71
John E. Burton Jr.	CPT	Adj, 97th MP Bn	Oct 71
Kenneth R. Wood	CPT	CO, 127th MP Co	Oct 71
Powell B. Price	1LT	Plt Ldr, 127th MP Co	Oct 71
Tommy William	1SG	1SG, 127th MP Co	Oct 71
Jimmy Glenn	SFC	Plt Sgt, 218th MP Co	Oct 71
Edwin Smith	SFC	Plt Sgt, 127th MP Co	Oct 71
Willy H. Sanders	SFC	Plt Sgt, 127th MP Co	Oct 71

(b) Departures:

Name	Grade	Job Title	Date
Ronald E. Boehmo	MAJ	XO, 97th MP Bn	May 71
James C. Crane Jr.	1LT	Plt Ldr, 630th MP Co	May 71
Craig M. Amos	1LT	S4 Off, 97th MP Bn	Jun 71
Douglas T. Bates	1LT	Plt Ldr, 630th MP Co	Jun 71

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 Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) Departures: (cont)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Job Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
Michael E. DeBerry	1LT	S2 Off, 97th MP Bn	Jun 71
Fred W. Hambrick	CSM	CSM, 97th MP Bn	Jun 71
Christino Duran	SFC	Plt Sgt, HHD, 97th MP Bn	Jun 71
William G. Peters	LTC	CO, 97th MP Bn	Jul 71
Charles E. Weeks	MAJ	PM, Nha Trang	Jul 71
Ronald H. Cleaver	CPT	CO, 630th MP Co	Jul 71
Daniel A. Creedon	CPT	Traff Con Off, 178th MP Det	Jul 71
Dale E. Dake	CPT	CO, 981st MP Co	Jul 71
Patrick C. Glisson	SFC	Plt Sgt, 630th MP Co	Jul 71
Jonathan S. Van Horn	LTC	PM, MR2 (S), CO, 178th MP Det	Aug 71
Thomas J. McHugh	CPT	S3 Off, 97th MP Bn	Aug 71
Charles Rumsey	1LT	Plt Ldr, 218th MP Co	Aug 71
Wade F. Lusk	SFC	S3 Sgt, 97th MP Bn	Aug 71
Jeffrey D. Goodwin	CPT	CO, 630th MP Co	Sep 71
John H. Taylor	CPT	Traff Con Off, 178th MP Det	Sep 71
Glen D. Burt	1LT	Plt Ldr, 218th MP Co	Sep 71
James M. Frost	1LT	Plt Ldr, 981st MP Co	Sep 71
George L. Warren	1SG	1SG, 630th MP Co	Sep 71
James N. Whitaker	SFC	Plt Sgt, 630th MP Co	Sep 71
Ronald C. McLean	CPT	S4 Off, 97th MP Bn	Oct 71
William N. Drake	1LT	Adj, 97th MP Bn	Oct 71
Bobby O. Edwards	SFC	Plt Sgt, 178th MP Det	Oct 71
George Y. Tada	Sfc	Plt Sgt, 630th MP Co	Oct 71

(3) Casualties:

(a) Battle Losses: OFF WO EM TOTAL

1 Killed 0 0 0 0

2 Wounded 0 0 1 1

(b) Non-battle Losses OFF WO EM TOTAL

1 Killed 0 0 0 0

2 Injured 0 0 3 3

(4) Reenlistments:

	<u>Eligible</u>	<u>Reenlistments</u>
(a) First Terms RA	64	1

(b) RA Career	20	14
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(4) Reenlistments: (cont)

	<u>Eligible</u>	<u>Reenlistments</u>
(c) AUS	137	0
(d) Other	0	0
(e) Total	221	15

(5) R&R:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Utilized</u>
May	100%
June	92%
July	87%
August	100%
September	100%
October	96%

(6) Strengths:

(a) US

1 As of 1 May 1971:

<u>AUTH</u>				<u>ASG</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
21	2	431	454	20	1	541	562

2 As of 31 October 1971:

<u>AUTH</u>				<u>ASG</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
25	2	719	746	23	2	734	759

(b) Local National Direct Hire:

1 As of May 1971:

<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASG</u>
93	88

Authorization Voucher Number - USARV Voucher 383

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Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

As of 31 October 1971:

AUTH

ASG

90

89

Authorization Voucher Number - USARV Voucher 383

(7) Extensions of Overseas Tours:

(a) Total Extensions	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
May	0	5	5
June	0	43	43
July	0	21	21
August	0	11	11
September	0	12	12
October	0	12	12

(b) Under PL 89-735 (6 mo)	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
May	0	2	2
June	0	9	9
July	0	6	6
August	0	2	2
September	0	0	0
October	0	0	0

(8) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Special Courts - 7

(b) Summary Courts - 0

(c) Article 15, UCMJ - 84

(9) Congressional Inquiries - 5

(10) Publications: The following documents were published during the reporting period:

(a) Letter of Instruction - Operation of Combined Checkpoints at Duc My and Khonh Duong dated 11 June 1971.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) Letter of Instruction - Procedure for Investigation of Violence Towards Members of This Command When Such Acts Occur in Camp or Cantonment dated 24 June 1971.

(c) Mission Statement - 127th Military Police Company dated 15 Oct 71.

(11) Public/Command Information:

(a) 20 News stories for Brigade newspaper "The Roundup".

(b) 55 Home town news releases.

(12) Civic Actions: The battalion engaged in no significant civic action activities during the reporting period.

(13) Historical Programs: The battalion maintains a historical file that contains pictures of changes of command, award ceremonies, promotion ceremonies and dedication ceremonies.

d. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence:

(1) 18th MP Bde, Second Regional Assistance Group HQ, and US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, continue to provide intelligence summaries on a timely basis. The information is analyzed and, where appropriate, disseminated to subordinate elements. Intelligence information received is sufficient to support the battalion mission.

(2) There were no reports of security violations or compromise.

(3) Intelligence Spot Reports Processed: 31.

(4) Prisoner of War Operations: During the reporting period, no prisoners of war were processed by this battalion.

(5) Intelligence Sources are:

(a) Intelligence Spot Reports from subordinate units.

(b) Intelligence Summaries from Higher Headquarters, ie, HQ 18th MP Bde SRAC, HQ 16th MP Gp, USARV.

(c) Intelligence Summaries from SUPCOM CRB.

(d) Review of Military Police blotter and reports.

(e) National Police Reports and Situation Documents.

e. Communications and COMSEC Activities:

(1) During the reporting period, the 97th Military Police Battalion's Communications Center transmitted 1557 electrical messages and received 1624 messages.

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(2) On 8 October 1971, the 97th Military Police Battalion began operation of a Military Police Administrative Net with stations at Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang. To date no calls for assistance have been received over this net.

f. Operations and Plans:

(1) OPORDS and OPLANS published: No OPORDS or OPLANS were published during the reporting period.

(2) Significant Operational Activities: During the reporting period the 97th Military Police Battalion and attached units were committed to the following combat support, law enforcement and security missions throughout Military Region 2 (South):

(a) Daily 23 Military Police Patrols are committed on a 24 hour basis. These patrols operate on an overlapping basis to provide maximum number of patrols during the highest incident period of the day. These patrols are primarily devoted to discipline, law and order missions on installations or base camps. The patrols listed below are all unilateral:

1 Cam Ranh Bay - 15 patrols

2 Nha Trang - 8 patrols

(b) At the end of the reporting period the battalion was operating 18 combined patrols, 8 combined checkpoints and 5 combined police stations.

Patrols are listed below:

1 Nha Trang - 4 CP

2 Brn Me Thuot - 2 CP

3 Cam Ranh Bay - 1 CP

4 Br. Ngoi - 4 CP

5 Dalat - 2 CP

6 Phan Rang - 4 CP

7 Phan Thiet - 1 CP

(c) At the end of the reporting period, the 981st MP Company (SD) was filling twenty-seven (27) sentry dog posts in the battalion area of operations. The Second Platoon of the 981st MP Company (SD) provided the sentry dog teams for these posts. Currently the sentry dog teams provide security

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for the following areas: An Army Airfield, Drug Treatment Center, Ammunition Storage Area and Supply Storage Areas.

(d) Throughout the reporting period military police support was provided to all military services and US companies located on the Cam Ranh Peninsula by the operation of Myca Checkpoint, Cam Ranh Village Gate and the Labor Pier. Military police personnel from the 97th Military Police Battalion provided a pass and identification section at Myca Checkpoint that maintained records on approximately 16,000 Vietnamese civilians and third country nationals that work or have worked for US Forces or US companies located on the Cam Ranh Peninsula. In addition the military police operated vehicle and pedestrian checklanes for all personnel entering or exiting Cam Ranh Peninsula.

(g) During the reporting period there were 2,105 individuals cited on DD Form 1408 for various violations. Also 4,833 Military Police Reports, DA Form 19-32, were initiated in the 97th Military Police Battalion's area of responsibility.

(f) During the reporting period the Physical Security Section conducted 12 Physical Security Surveys and 26 Physical Security Inspections throughout Military Region 2 (South).

(g) There were 12 recurring programmed convoys in addition to special convoys escorted by military policemen of the 97th Military Police Battalion during the reporting period. The number of convoys escorted between the below listed points of origin and destination is as follows:

1 Recurring Convoys:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	Phan Rang	182
Phan Rang	Cam Ranh Bay	182
Cam Ranh Bay	Nha Trang	175
Nha Trang	Cam Ranh Bay	175
Cam Ranh Bay	Ban Me Thuot	24
Ban Me Thuot	Cam Ranh Bay	24
Cam Ranh Bay	Camp Dillard	21
Camp Dillard	Cam Ranh Bay	21

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**1 Recurring Convoys (continued)**

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	Dalat	8
Dalat	Cam Ranh Bay	8
Cam Ranh Bay	Tuy Hoa	10
Tuy Hoa	Cam Ranh Bay	10

**2 Special Convoys:**

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>NO. OF CONVOYS</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	Song Mao	2
Song Mao	Cam Ranh Bay	2
Cam Ranh Bay	Don Duong	5
Don Duong	Cam Ranh Bay	5
Cam Ranh Bay	Qui Nhon	1
Qui Nhon	Cam Ranh Bay	1
Cam Ranh Bay	Nhon Co	1
Nhon Co	Cam Ranh Bay	1
Cam Ranh Bay	Phu Cat	1
Phu Cat	Cam Ranh Bay	1
Cam Ranh Bay	Phan Rang	4
Phan Rang	Cam Ranh Bay	4

2 These 772 convoys were escorted a total of 61,274 kilometers.

(h) During the reporting period the 97th Military Police Battalion utilized a helicopter to assist in detecting speeders and other violators of rules, regulations and orders. The aircraft flew 30 hours and 30 minutes, resulting in 34 vehicle citations, 3 off-limits citations, 5 convoys overflown and 2 demonstrations observed. The helicopter was also utilized

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AVENT-JB

1 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police  
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to spot fallen or missing road signs, visibility of lane markings, and general condition of the roads.

(i) During the reporting period the 97th Military Police Battalion processed 625 Serious Incident Reports.

(j) On 18 June 1971, Team A, 2nd Platoon, 981st MP Company (SD) was relocated to Cam Ranh Bay due to the elimination of sentry dog posts at Phan Rang.

(k) On 20 June 1971, the 218th Military Police Company placed police checkpoints into operation at Khanh Duong and Duc My on QL-21 located between Ninh Hoa and Ban He Thuot. The two checkpoints are operated by a combined police force of MP's, QC's, Canh Sats and Korean Military Policemen.

(l) On 21 June 1971, a Drug Treatment Center (DTC) was established at the 6th Convalescent Center, Cam Ranh Bay. 32 Military Policemen from the 93rd Military Police Battalion were attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion to provide military police support to the DTC. On 18 August 1971 44 additional military policemen from the 93rd Military Police Battalion were attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion to augment the military police force at the DTC. On 9 October 1971, the 127th Military Police Company was moved from Qui Nhon to the 22nd Replacement Battalion, Cam Ranh Bay. The 127th Military Police Company is now assigned to the 97th Military Police Battalion and is tasked with providing all military police personnel for security at the DTC. The mission of the military police at the DTC is:

- 1 To protect patient and medical personnel.
- 2 To prevent the entry of dangerous drugs and other contraband items.
- 3 To prevent the unlawful exit of patients prior to their detoxification.
- 4 To maintain an orderly and cooperative environment within the Drug Treatment Center.

Preventing the entrance of dangerous drugs into the DTC and the unlawful exit of patients from the DTC is accomplished by MP's manning a series of static posts which provide visual observation of all fence lines. Entrance and exit gates are manned by MP's who screen all personnel entering and leaving the DTC.

The illegal entry of contraband items is inhibited by random searches of permanent party personnel entering the compound, searching patients and their belongings thoroughly while processing into the DTC, conducting periodic shakedowns with the permission of the installation commander and performing spot searches in specific areas of the DTC.

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1 November 1971

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The protection of patients and medical personnel is accomplished by utilizing walking patrols within the DTC during daylight and evening hours. Between 2230 hours and 0600 hours the MP's are assigned directly to patient wards. Two MP's are present in the mess hall during patient messing hours.

Patients who are uncooperative or fail to follow the rules and prescribed routine of the DTC may be placed in a separation area which confines uncooperative patients to a smaller area and closer MP supervision. Patients who consistently fail to cooperate may be placed in a one-man cell. Two-man cells are presently in the separation ward. Patients who have violated articles of the UCMJ have been charged and in certain instances placed in pre-trial confinement in the Long Binh Stockade.

(n) The marijuana detection program in the 981st MP Company (SD) was expanded upon the addition of an additional dog, Dicki 78X9, in late August 1971. The animals were offered for support of major units and installations within the Can Ranh Bay and Nha Trang area. Coordination for all inspections was made through the Provost Marshal Operations, Can Ranh Bay. Since 24 July 1971, the animals have supported ten (10) organizations in eleven (11) inspections. As a result of the inspections the animals have recovered some 935 handrolled marijuana cigarettes, 13 lbs of loose marijuana, 35 full vials of heroin, several vials of gun opium and numerous narcotic paraphernalia. The estimated value of the total recovery on the Vietnamese market is \$1300. During the period 12 August to 12 September 1971, Duke 12X7 was non-productive due to change of handlers and retraining. At present, plans have been formulated to expand the training and utilization of the dogs. During the last reporting period the dog was utilized twice at the Myca Checkpoint to shake-down vehicles entering the installations. The operation was not in the confines of a building but in full view of the public. Although the dogs recovery results were negative during the two inspections, working the dogs in public view is believed to present a very strong deterrent factor.

(n) On 7 September 1971, a combined police station with the Military Policemen from the 218th Military Police Company became operational at Ban Mo Thuot. This station is located at Camp Coryell and coordinates combined police activities throughout the area. The police force consists of MP's, QC's and Canh Sats. With the inception of the combined police station on 7 September 1971, all unilateral police patrols and operations were suspended.

(o) Beginning in September, a monthly meeting was established with the QC Provost Marshal, National Police Station Commander, Korean Station Commander and the US Army Provost Marshal concerning the combined police operations in Nha Trang, RVN.

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(p) On 15 September 1971 the 218th Military Police Company began committing a V-100 during the Low Lunar illumination period of each month to provide additional security for Myca Checkpoint and Myca Bridge. This addition to the Military Police and other security forces present at this location greatly enhance the security posture of this vital area.

(q) On 18 September and 30 September 1971, a special military police task force conducted intensified operations at Myca Checkpoint. The force consisted of 42 MP's including PM Investigators, Nung Guards and marijuana dogs. Results were three plastic bags of heroin, 16 plastic bags of marijuana, 75 vials of heroin, 7 pistols and 2 automatic weapons were confiscated. One Filipino was apprehended for possession of drugs. Twenty-four Vietnamese women were apprehended for having no ID cards and approximately 500 installation passes were invalidated for various violations.

(r) On 25 September 1971, 15 Military Policemen from the 630th Military Police Company were deployed south by air to Whiskey Mountain to assist Task Force Whiskey personnel in apprehending 14 males who were armed and barricaded in a bunker. Prior to arrival of the Military Policemen, a homemade explosive device was detonated in the rear of the bunker after which all of the 14 personnel walked to the dispensary for treatment. The military police reaction force arrived upon the scene and placed all 14 individuals under apprehension and searched them. Necessary paperwork was prepared by the 35th Engineer Group and all of the apprehended personnel were transported under guard by air (Chinook helicopter) to the Long Binh Stockade. The Military Police reaction force returned to Cam Ranh Bay on 26 September 1971.

(s) On 6 October 1971, the 981st MP Company (SD) Team F Detachment located at Ban Me Thuot was relocated to bolster Nha Trang dog detachment. This relocation was due to the elimination of units requiring sentry dog posts in the Ban Me Thuot, Camp Coryell compound.

(t) On 17 October 1971, a task force of 44 MP's raided the 611 Ord Co, 46th Engr Det, 6/32 Arty, B/40th Sig Bn and the entire 10th Trans Bn. 18 VN Females were apprehended, 4 soldiers were apprehended for harboring VN Females and \$200 in IPC was confiscated.

(u) On 27 October 1971, Military Police Strike Force consisting of 16 Military Policemen and one marijuana sniffer dog were airlifted to Praline Mountain Signal Site near Dalat. This was prompted by two fragmentation grenade incidents on consecutive nights. Initially one CID investigator and four Military Policemen were airlifted into Praline mountain to conduct investigations of the grenade incidents and to provide security for the Company Commander, who was the apparent target for the grenades. The Military Police Strike Force assisted the unit commander in conducting "Health and Welfare" inspections and confiscated large quantities of contraband items. The operation ended at 1400 hours of 27 October 1971, with the Military Policemen returning to Cam Ranh Bay. A residual force of six Military Policemen remained at Praline Mountain for three additional days until the unit was able to handle the situation.

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(3) Force Development: As directed on 18th Military Police Brigade General Orders Number 336 effective 12 August 1971, the 97th Military Police Battalion was relieved from OPCON of the 178th Military Police Detachment (PM) and assumed area provost marshal responsibility and responsibility for providing military police support for Military Region 2 (South). The 97th MP Bn exercises operational control of the 178th Military Police Detachment (PM). The Commanding Officer of the 97th Military Police Battalion was designated as area Provost Marshal of MR 2 (South). The same general order assigned the 178th Military Police Detachment (PM) to the 97th Military Police Battalion and provided that the 97th Military Police Battalion would provide logistic and administrative support to the 178th MP Detachment (PM).

(4) Organization:

(a) On 21 June 1971, 32 Military Policemen from the 93rd Military Police Battalion were attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion to provide security for the Drug Treatment Center (DTC) at Cam Ranh Bay.

(b) On 18 August 1971, an additional 44 Military Policemen from the 93rd Military Police Battalion were attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion to augment the security force at the DTC.

(c) On 9 October 1971, the 127th Military Police Company was relocated from Qui Nhon to Cam Ranh Bay. The 127th Military Police Company has been tasked with providing military police personnel for security at the DTC as well as providing military police support for the 22nd Replacement Battalion. The personnel formerly provided by the 93rd Military Police Battalion for security duty returned to their respective units on 16 October 1971.

(5) Training:

(a) During the reporting period, 1,125 enlisted personnel in the grades E-2 through E-6 attended a 32 hour block of instruction of in-country replacement training. This in-country orientation is conducted by the 97th Military Police Battalion for all replacement personnel designated for assignment to units of the 16th Military Police Group.

(b) A complete evaluation was made of the in-country training program by the S-3 section of the 97th Military Police Battalion during August and September 1971. The proposed revised Program of Instruction is presently being studied by the 16th Military Police Group for recommended changes.

(c) During the reporting period the S-3 section of the 97th Military Police Battalion conducted inspections of all subordinate units with special emphasis on unit operations, unit training and maintenance of training records.

(6) Logistics:

(a) Total Mileage for the Battalion during the reporting period was 590,993.

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(b) Mission essential equipment shortages in the Battalion during the reporting period were as follows:

1 M-3 Riot Dispenser: During the reporting period an area of great concern was the occurrence of disturbances at the Detoxification Center located at 6th CC. These dispersers were difficult to obtain and when finally obtained were at the time inoperable. The dispersers were repaired and classes were given by S-4 section. The dispersers are now operational at 6th CC and Battalion Headquarters.

2 Motorola HT 220 Radio Set: With the opening of the Drug Treatment Center the need for Military Policemen at the center was essential. Recently the 127th Military Police Company was relocated to Cam Ranh and given the mission of support for 6th CC and PM activities for the 22nd Replacement Battalion Compound. The 93rd Military Police Company transferred 3 HT 220 Motorola Radios to the 127th Military Police Company and eight (8) AN/PRC-88 radios. The efficiency of the HT 220 has been proven; but the quantity is still inadequate. The 16th MP Group S-4 has been notified and is assisting in the process of acquiring more radios.

3 XM706 Armored Car (V-100): During the last reporting period an armored car was requisitioned and arrived, but there was still the need for more armored cars. To fulfill the need three (3) V-100's were laterally transferred from the 93rd MP Battalion to this battalion. The amount has proved sufficient.

4 Replacements parts for  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks: A significant shortage of carburetors, differentials and universal joints for  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles exists. In addition, many rebuilt replacement parts have proved faulty.

Example: The replacement carburetors on the M151A1  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks. Being an exchange item, most carburetors are reconstructed from existing carburetors that have been turned in for salvage. Recently the 218th MP Company had the experience of replacing six (6) carburetors on one  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle until an operative one was found. These carburetors were received from the 557th Support Maintenance, Nha Trang, and the packing boxes had not been opened prior to installation at the local unit level. Difficulty has also been experienced in ordering parts for the battalion's M151A2's since neither the battalion nor our support maintenance facilities have received technical manuals for these vehicles. This problem is lessened however by the fact that many of the parts on the M151A2 are identical to those on the M151A1. It is expected that TM's for the M151A2's will be arriving at support maintenance shortly.

2.(c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations:

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Intelligence: None
- c. Operations:

- (1) Combined Police Operations

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(a) **OBSERVATION:** The area which seems to create most of the problems in the working relationships of the combined patrols is the language.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Greater effort is necessary in elimination of problems created due to differences in language and customs. Close contact both socially and officially by supervisory personnel creates the necessary knowledge to solve problems the US Military Police encounter on a day to day basis. Social encounters enable somewhat touchy problems to be discussed without police counterparts feeling offended or embarrassed.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Monthly meetings as recently established in Nha Trang are very necessary to insure understanding and increased efficiency in combined operations. Close supervision of combined operations by counterparts is of the essence. Such interest brings the best out of personnel working combined patrols and also enables a commander to deal with day to day problems his men encounter. A desk sergeant's journal containing information on any problems, incidents or conflicts pertaining to a member of the combined operations is essential for insuring the problems will be discussed and solutions made for them.

(2) **Physical Security:**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The Physical Security Program for the security of small arms and ammunition in RVN, as implemented by USARV Reg 190-30, dtd 21 Jul 71, encourages compliance with AR 190-11. The USARV Regulation allows any responsible individual to determine the adequacy of his physical security measures upon considerations of his situation and resources. It fails to establish an adequate minimum standard for the security of these items.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The security of small arms and ammunition is of increasing concern to commanders at all echelons. Due to many diverse situations encountered masonry type structures are rarely available to be employed as arms rooms within USARV, as is required by AR 190-11. USARV has noted this fact and subsequently allowed responsible individuals, cognizant of the local situation, to determine the structural requirements of arms rooms compatible with their situation. However, by allowing any responsible individual to determine what type structure and/or modified structure is adequate, many arms rooms are considered adequate when they provide little or no deterrent to forced entry. This is especially evident upon the conduction of Physical Security Inspections of arms rooms.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the existing regulations and directives be supplemented or superseded to provide adequate command guidance and more selective controls for personnel with the responsibility of prescribing minimum standards for the security of small arms and ammunition.

(3) **Intensified Operations at Myca Checkpoint:**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Due to the large volume of traffic at Myca Checkpoint (approximately 12,000 personnel and 2,000 vehicles per day) any extended period of intensified operations would cause a tremendous traffic jam.

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(b) EVALUATION: When intensified operations were conducted at Myca Checkpoint in September 1971, it was discovered that optimum results could be obtained by conducting intensified searches for approximately 1½ hours initially and at periodic intervals during the remainder of the day. This allows an effective search to be conducted without unduly hindering movement of traffic through the checkpoint.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When intensified search operations are contemplated for heavily travelled locations such as Myca Checkpoint, the operation should be limited to a relatively short period (1 to 1½ hours, depending on the amount of traffic and type of operation), coupled with periodic follow-up operations throughout the day.

#### (4) Raids on Unit Areas:

(1) OBSERVATION: When raids in unit areas were requested by battalion or higher level commanders, it was found that attempts to coordinate with unit officers prior to the raids resulted in unit personnel learning of the raids in advance. As a result a smaller number of apprehensions were made on these raids.

(2) EVALUATION: If raids to discover contraband, narcotics or unauthorized personnel in troop billets are to be effective, the element of surprise must be maintained. When company level officers are notified in advance of raids called for by higher headquarters, the element of surprise is often lost. Better results are obtained from raids when the unit officers are not notified of the raid until after the area has been cordoned off.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that raids of unit areas be coordinated with battalion or higher level commanders whenever feasible, and that unit officers be notified of the raid only at the last minute, preferably after the area has been cordoned off.

#### (5) UTILIZATION OF NUNG GUARDS:

(1) OBSERVATION: The 178th Military Police Detachment (PM) presently employs six females Nung guards at Cam Ranh Bay. These Nung guards are billeted on the Cam Ranh Army Installation. Military Police perform guard duties at the Nung guard quarters. The Nung guards are utilized on a daily basis at Cam Ranh Village Gate, the Labor Pier and Cam Ranh Bay Military Police Station. They are also used on special operations as required.

(2) EVALUATION: The utilization of Nung guards has met with considerable success. Nung guards are effective in the apprehension of female personnel passing narcotics and contraband but also present a deterrent by their presence. They are superior to local national security personnel in duty performance, honesty and reliability.

The number of Nung guards presently assigned to this installation is inadequate to effectively police the large number of VN female personnel who are employed at this installation. There are at present approximately 9000 VN females employed on this installation, which means that each Nung Guard would have to search 1500 females twice daily to effectively control pilferage and

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the introduction of drugs into the installation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the Nung guard strength be increased to one (1) per 500 females employed on the installation. This would bring the total number to eighteen (18) here at Cam Ranh Bay. That the logistics branch of the supported installation provide all necessary support ie, billeting, rations, uniforms; transportation and medical care. That the 97th Military Police Battalion retain operational control of the Nung guards.

#### (6) PATROL DOGS:

(1) OBSERVATION: Beginning on 6 October 1971, one patrol dog team began working with the Provost Marshals Office in Cam Ranh Bay. This patrol dog team was given a variety of assignments, among these were walking patrol at Cam Ranh Village Gate, 22nd Repl Battalion Area and at the Main NCO and EM Club at closing time. The patrol dog team was utilized with the Patrol Supervisor in a motorized patrol.

(2) EVALUATION: The patrol dog team has been found to be very valuable as a deterrent factor. In cases where the patrol dog team was called to the scene of a disturbance, spectators and or/or people involved have either dispersed or responded to the Military Policemen's instructions without delay. Personnel be they Military or civilian, tend to have more respect for the Military Police when a patrol dog team is present on the scene. Due to the success of the pilot patrol dog team, an additional 3 patrol dog teams have begun training.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to expansion of the patrol Dog Program to provide at least one patrol dog team per shift to augment the Military Police Patrols.

#### d. Organization:

(1) OBSERVATION: The Drug Treatment Center was opened within the 6th Convalescent Center compound on 21 June 1971. It was necessary to provide Military Police Personnel to perform the security mission at the Drug Treatment Center. The military police personnel were drawn from the resources of the 93rd Military Police Battalion.

(2) EVALUATION: The Military Police personnel were not organized into a single unit before being transferred to the Drug Treatment Center. Upon their arrival many command and control problems developed. The quarters made available were poorly equipped to handle the influx of Military Police personnel. During August of 1971 an additional platoon from the 127th Military Police Company was attached to the 97th Military Police Battalion for duty at the Drug Treatment Center, because the original number of military Policemen could not properly handle the various incidents occurring within the Drug Treatment Center.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: During the planning of an operation of this nature, the designation of a single unit rather than detachments of several units would greatly enhance the overall efficiency of the operation, especially in terms of ensuring adequate arrangements for equipment, quarters, etc.

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and preventing confusion as to the command and control of the operation during its initial phase.

e. Training:

(1) OBSERVATION: Student comments concerning the In-country Training Program were analyzed and it was determined that a re-evaluation needed to be made of the In-country Training Program to provide a training program which would be beneficial to replacement personnel.

(2) EVALUATION: A detailed evaluation of all courses and the response from the replacement personnel to these courses revealed that many of the classes were repetitions of classes received in CONUS prior to arrival in RVN. The films, presented as a segment of some classes, were generally outdated and applied to different type operations than those currently conducted in RVN. Predominantly the most successful classes presented were those that concerned the individual soldier, those that could provide him with the necessary information to protect his life and health. Examples: Mines and Booby Traps, Drug Abuse, and Survival, Escape and Evasion.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The recommended changes include the introduction of classes that relate directly to activities in Vietnam, instead of general military police operations. The program of instruction should be changed to include demonstrations and/or displays as well as lectures. Classes that are similar should be condensed into a single block of instruction. Example: VC/NVA tactics condensed with Sapper and Counter Sapper Training.

These changes will help hold the attention of the replacement personnel and make them more receptive to the training program which is necessary for the retention of valuable information given during the training period.

f. Logistics:

(1) OBSERVATION: This organization at the end of the reporting period is experiencing a severe shortage of  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton trucks which dictates the use of many vehicles on a 24 hour basis to perform the mission. This continuous use precludes the performance of proper daily maintenance on several vehicles, which increases the deadline rate.

(2) EVALUATION: As the draw down of US Forces continues at a steady rate, the Military Police units find themselves performing greater roles especially in the area of security for installations and connecting roadways. To perform this role, the vehicles of the Military Police units must be in the best operating condition possible. There must be sufficient equipment on hand to provide necessary vehicles so that a Military Police Reaction Force can be committed without utilizing vehicles that are necessary to perform the daily operational commitments.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: This organization, as well as other Military Police units, should have a very high priority for the acquisition of  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicles

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to alleviate shortages which hamper the performance of the Military Police mission.

g. Communications:

(1) OBSERVATION: Because of the large geographical area of operations assigned to the 97th Military Police Battalion, maximum utilization of communications equipment and personnel is essential to the accomplishment of our mission. The 97th Military Police Battalion is experiencing a critical shortage of qualified communications personnel. The inception of the Military Police Administrative Net has placed an added strain upon the personnel and equipment of the communications section.

(2) EVALUATION: A severe shortage of qualified trained commo personnel has caused the communications posture of the Battalion to fall at a steady rate. Telephone communications leave much to be desired, especially between some of the outlying detachments such as Ban Me Thuot, Phan Thiet, Dalat and Goodwin Pass. Poor telephone connections with higher headquarters causes the RTT net to be used to a greater extent than it should be.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That priority acquisition and assignment of experienced, school trained communications personnel be given to this unit. Additionally, communications equipment, such as Radio set AN/VRC-46, RC-292 antennas and power units should be made available to supply needed power for proper operations.


h. Materiel:

(1) OBSERVATION: At the present time the XM706 armored car is invaluable for use as a convoy escort vehicle. However, because of continual use, it requires frequent maintenance and parts replacement and due to the difficulty of obtaining replacement parts, is often deadlined for long periods of time.

(2) EVALUATION: The V-100 is a formidable deterrent against enemy attacks on convoys. It produces superior firepower while maintaining excellent security for personnel inside the vehicle. It is detrimental to the convoy mission of the Battalion to have these vehicles deadlined for any longer than is absolutely necessary.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That consideration be given to improving the delivery of spare parts for the XM706 armored car. Specifically such items as: brake shoes, clutches, acceleration cables, wheel cylinders and starter kits.

i. Other: None.

  
JAMES E. REICHEL  
LTC, MPC  
Commanding

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A/MSGF-B (1 Nov 71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police  
Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFGR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96349 2 December 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade, ATTN: AVBOC-O  
APO San Francisco 96491

1. (U) The 97th Military Police Battalion's ORLL for the semi-annual reporting period ending 31 October 1971 is submitted.
2. (C) The inclosed report has been reviewed and is considered adequate. The following comments refer to referenced sections of the report:
  - a. Reference para 1f: Weather did not impact military police operations or support during the reporting period.
  - b. Reference para 1f(6)1 and 2: Shortages in equipment were caused by the assumption of a new mission with little or no planning time involved and the lack of previous experience upon which to base equipment needs. Shortages have been overcome by unit initiative.
3. (U) The following comments refer to referenced sections of paragraph 2 of the report:
  - a. Reference para 2c(1): Concur. Effective combined operations depends upon mutual understanding and acceptance by all personnel involved.
  - b. Reference para 2c(2): Concur. A USARV supplement to AR 190-11 should be published outlining the minimum standard requirements acceptable within RVN.
  - c. Reference para 2c(3): Concur. Due to the volume of traffic through the MYCA Checkpoint, search operations must be limited to spot checks, or the search must be kept short during peak ingress or egress hours.
  - d. Reference para 2c(4): Concur. This item was also commented by this Headquarters in its ORLL for the same period.
  - e. Reference para 2c(5): Concur. This item was also commented on by this Headquarters in its ORLL for the same period.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

f. Reference para 2c(6): Concur. The inherent flexibility of patrol dogs over sentry dogs makes them a valuable adjunct to both military police and physical security operations. A minimum number of patrol dog teams should be trained and placed into operations within each MR.

g. Reference para 2d: Concur. Commented upon by this Headquarters in its ORLL for the reporting period.

h. Reference para 2e: Concur in part. The purpose of in-country training is to orient personnel towards operations or activities within the Republic of Vietnam. The course is continually reviewed and updated as required. The latest revision to the program was on 31 May 1971 on request of the Commanding Officer, 97th Military Police Battalion.

i. Reference para 2f: Concur in part. Military police units are dependent upon the 1/4 ton vehicle to accomplish the major portion of their mission within the Republic of Vietnam and should, therefore, have a higher priority of allocation over units that utilize the 1/4 ton merely as an administrative vehicle. During the reporting period, the shortage of 1/4 ton vehicles in the 97th Military Police Battalion was not considered severe and the unit was able to accomplish its mission with little difficulty.

j. Reference para 2g: Concur. The 97th Military Police Battalion is presently short of their authorized communications personnel. Additional equipment would benefit the communications capability of the organization. The unit has been made aware of the procedures for obtaining needed equipment.

k. Reference para 2h: Concur. It is suggested that the unit make regular liaison visits to supply and maintenance supporting units and utilize the Commander's Critical Items List when problems arise in obtaining specific repair parts.

DAVID J. ANDERSON  
LTC, MPC  
Commanding

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AVBGC-0 (1 Nov 71) 2nd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police  
Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491 17 December 1971

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDC-DO,  
APO 96375  
Commanding Officer, 97th Military Police Battalion, APO 96312

1. Comments on Significant Activities: None.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:

a. Para 2c(1), Combined Police Operations: Concur. This Headquarters provides one officer as a member of the Combined Police Survey Team which reports their findings directly to the Combined Police Council for the improvement of combined police operations theater-wide.

b. Para 2c(2), Physical Security: Concur in part. While the minimum standards outlined in AR 190-11 are required army-wide, the regulation fails to outline provisions for security when the minimum structural requirements cannot be met, i.e., continuous surveillance. It is recommended that any USARV supplement include such a provision.

c. Para 2c(3), Intensified Operations at Myca Checkpoint: Concur.

d. Para 2c(4), Raids on Unit Areas: Concur.

e. Para 2c(5), Utilization of Nung Guards: Concur.


f. Para 2c(6), Patrol Dogs: Concur. This Headquarters has previously recommended an expansion of the patrol dog program to USARV. USARPAC disapproved the request pending results of two studies currently being conducted by DA.

g. Para 2d, Organization: Concur. It should be noted that the formation, activation and growth of the DTC was a sudden, unanticipated project. Future planning for establishment of like facilities should be thoroughly coordinated with all parties concerned, from conception to activation.

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- h. Para 2e, Training: Concur.
  - i. Para 2f, Logistics: Concur.
  - j. Para 2g, Communications. Concur with para 3j of the 1st Ind. A shortage of communications personnel is being experienced throughout this command.
  - k. Para 2h, Materiel: Concur with para 3k of the 1st Ind.
3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

  
PAUL M. TIMMERBERG  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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AVHDO-DO (1 Nov 71) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 97th Military Police  
Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 8 MAR 1972


TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 97th Military Police Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comment follows:

Reference item concerning "Physical Security", paragraph 2c(2), page 15: Concur with the recommendation contained in 2d indorsement, paragraph 2b. Provisions for security of small arms and ammunition, when the minimum structural requirements cannot be met, will be incorporated into a change to USARV Reg 190-30.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
D. A. KEENAN  
Captain, AGC  
Asst AG



GPOP-FD (1 Nov 71) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 97th  
Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October  
1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Mah*

M. L. MAH  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)			2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>Confidential</b>	
1a. DA, Washington, D. C. 20310			2b. GROUP <b>4</b>	
3. REPORT TITLE <b>Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs., 97th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)</b>				
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5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) <b>CO, 97th Military Police Bn</b>				
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